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Abstract. One frequently given explanation for why autocrats maintain corrupt and inefficient institutions is that the 
autocrats benefit personally even though the citizens of their countries are worse off. The empirical evidence does not 
support this hypothesis. Autocrats in countries with low-quality institutions do tend to be wealthy, but typically, they were 
wealthy before they assumed power. A plausible explanation, consistent with the data, is that wealthy individuals in 
countries with inefficient and corrupt institutions face the threat of having their wealth appropriated by government, so 
have the incentive to use some of their wealth to seek political power to protect the rest of their wealth from confiscation. 
While autocrats may use government institutions to increase their wealth, autocrats in countries with low-quality 
institutions tend to be wealthy when they assume power, because wealthy individuals have the incentive to use their 
wealth to acquire political power to protect themselves from a potentially predatory government. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An important question in economic development is why autocrats in poor countries maintain 
low-quality economic institutions when a substantial body of literature concludes that specific 
institutional improvements can produce higher economic growth rates and higher per capita 
incomes. One common answer is that while the general population may be better off with 
higher-quality economic institutions, the political elite is better off maintaining more oppressive 
economic institutions that benefits it, even though those institutions make their countries poorer. 
Referring to the poor states of Africa, Ayittey (2008: 168) says, “African despots are loath to 
relinquish control or power. They would rather destroy their economies and countries than give 
up economic and political power. This power allows them to allocate or extract resources to 
build personal fortunes and to dispense patronage to buy political support.” Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006: 115) say it is “…because superior institutions and technologies may reduce 
their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced.” Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2013) emphasize the importance of taking into account both economic and political factors 
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when looking at the potential for economic reform, and offer examples that illustrate the peril of 
not doing so. 
If autocrats benefit from maintaining low-quality economic institutions, an important question 
is what benefit autocrats actually receive. The few systematic empirical studies that have been 
done have not found evidence that the political elite receive any benefit from low-quality 
economic institutions. This paper uses a small dataset that looks directly at autocrat wealth to 
see if it is positively impacted, and finds no evidence that it is. The evidence indicates that if 
anything, autocrats benefit from overseeing institutional improvements in their countries, and 
one would conjecture that if this research is correct, autocrats themselves would be in a good 
position to recognize the benefits they could reap from improving institutions. A plausible 
explanation for why they do not improve institutions in their countries is that institutional change 
is difficult to implement and cannot be accomplished by a single individual, even if that individual 
wants to improve institutional quality and has substantial political power. 
The casual observation that poor countries tend to be ruled by wealthy autocrats may have 
led researchers to consider the wrong question. Wealthy autocrats tend to be wealthy when 
they assume power, so a more appropriate question is why wealthy individuals in countries with 
inefficient and corrupt institutions seek political power when the wealthy do not typically do so in 
countries with higher-quality institutions. The wealthy in the United States, Western Europe, and 
Japan, for example, tend to focus on their economic activities rather than seek political office.1 
The observation of wealthy autocrats in poor countries is consistent with the hypothesis that 
when institutional quality is poor, the wealthy use some of their wealth to seek political power to 
protect the rest of their wealth from confiscation by the political elite. Wealthy autocrats hold 
political power in poor counties not because those institutions enable them to enhance their 
wealth, but rather because those governments tend to be more predatory, so the wealthy seek 
political power to protect their wealth from government predation. 
2. Evidence on the Benefits to Autocrats 
Despite the conventional wisdom that autocrats receive personal benefits from maintaining low-
quality economic institutions at the expense of the well-being of their citizens, there is relatively 
little evidence to support that conclusion. As noted in the introduction, Ayittey (2008) offers 
anecdotal evidence regarding African dictatorships. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) develop a 
theoretical framework in which policies that can produce economic development for the general 
population can also impose costs on political elites, causing them to choose to inhibit economic 
development for their own benefit. They offer historical examples of Czarist Russia and the 
nineteenth century Austro-Hungarian Empire to support their case, but also show, using the 
United States, Germany, and Britain as examples, that political elites sometimes implement 
development-enhancing institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) look at destabilizing 
                                                            
1 Donald Trump is a notable exception here, but Trump is different from most other wealthy Americans in 
that he was a television personality prior to running for office, a profession that rewards a high-profile 
public image. Unlike President Trump, most wealthy individuals try to keep a low profile and remain out of 
the public eye rather than seeking personal recognition, as Trump did well before he ran for public office. 
108 
C. Boudreaux and R. Holcombe / European Journal of Government and Economics 6(2), 106-125 
 
economic reforms in Ghana and Sierra Leone to show how improving economic institutions can 
work to the detriment of political elites. This evidence is anecdotal: a theoretical framework with 
case studies that provide examples consistent with the model. 
Anecdotes can also be found that lean the other way. Both Augusto Pinochet in Chile and 
Park Chung-hee in South Korea were autocrats who held power for 16 years in their countries 
and implemented substantial economic reform, which provided benefits to both the autocrats 
and their citizens.2 Examples can be cited both for countries in which autocrats ruled countries 
that remained poor and with low-quality institutions and cases in which autocrats improved 
institutional quality and oversaw institutional improvement and increases in income. If better 
institutions create wealth, there should be a way to distribute that wealth so that everyone 
benefits, although Rodrik (2014) notes that it can be difficult to design institutional reforms that 
guarantee that everyone will share in the gains. Anecdotes can be chosen to support various 
conclusions. 
Evidence on the issue is mostly anecdotal and we are aware of only two studies that look at 
a cross-section of countries for evidence that political elites benefit personally from maintaining 
low-quality economic institutions that reduce the standard of living for their citizens. Holcombe 
and Rodet (2012) use government spending as a proxy for benefits to political elites under the 
assumption that while those elites cannot appropriate all that government spends, they control 
who gets the benefits of that spending. They look at a set of more than 100 countries with all 
types of governments – not just autocracies – to see if lower-quality economic institutions 
increase the size of government, both in real per capita terms and as a share of total income. 
They find that better economic institutions are associated with a larger government share, which 
suggests that political elites could benefit from improved economic institutions. Political elites 
have control over more resources when economic institutions are improved, calling into 
question the conventional wisdom that political elites benefit from maintaining low-quality 
economic institutions. 
Looking at the claim of Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) that institutional reforms may 
destabilize the incumbent regime, Holcombe and Boudreaux (2013) examine a dataset of 80 
autocrats and find that the greater the increase in the quality of economic institutions under their 
tenure, the longer their tenure, indicating that autocrats can increase their hold on power by 
improving institutional quality. The few studies that analyze a dataset of multiple countries rather 
than anecdotal evidence and case studies conclude that autocrats can improve their control 
over resources and their hold on power by implementing higher-quality economic institutions, 
calling into question the hypothesis that autocrats maintain poor institutions because they 
benefit at the expense of their citizens. 
                                                            
2 Another possibly relevant example is Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency of the Republic of Georgia from 
2004-2013. Although Saakashvili was elected, Georgia was poor and its government was corrupt and 
inefficient when he came to power. Substantial economic reforms led Georgia to prosper relative to its 
economic status prior to his presidency and when compared with other former Soviet republics in the 
Caucuses. As president, Saakashvili was also accused of appropriating property without compensation 
and cronyism during his term in office. This is an example of a political leader who improved economic 
institutions both for the benefit of his citizens and himself and his cronies as an elected leader. 
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This study examines additional evidence on the relationship between autocrat wealth and 
the quality of economic institutions. The evidence here is more direct than in previous studies, 
although it is from a limited dataset on the wealth of 35 autocrats. There is no comprehensive 
data available on the wealth of autocrats, so this study relies on data collected from various 
sources on that wealth. Recognizing the limitations of the data, the findings here are conclusive. 
Rather, they offer some additional evidence that calls into question the hypothesis that autocrats 
benefit personally from maintaining low-quality economic institutions. 
The results that follow are consistent with the hypothesis that in countries with low-quality 
institutions, wealthy individuals are attracted to political power, perhaps to protect their wealth 
from predation that can occur in countries that have a poor record of protecting property rights 
and establishing rule of law. 
 
3. Data on the Wealth of Autocrats and Institutional Quality 
 
Table 1 lists 35 autocrats along with their countries, the time periods in which they were in 
power, and their wealth. Data sources are listed in Appendix 1. The dataset is limited because 
these were the only autocrats for which we were able to find estimates of their wealth. Wealth 
information was found for leaders of countries who ruled in 2010. In a few cases, leaders from 
previous years were also included in the analysis. Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh exited office in 
2006, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo exited in 1997, and Mohamed 
Suharto of Indonesia exited in 1998. For these leaders, wealth estimates are adjusted for 
inflation and stated in 2010 U.S. dollars. 
Included in the list are several monarchs who have limited power over their governments but 
who have retained power that is largely symbolic. While they would not ordinarily be classified 
as autocrats, they make a good comparison group as wealthy heads of state in countries that 
have relatively high-quality economic and political institutions. This allows a comparison of the 
effects of institutional quality that includes a wider range of institutions, rather than just low-
quality institutions. 
The quality of economic institutions was measured using the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) Index, updated annually by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2012). 
The EFW index is frequently used as a measure of the quality of economic institutions. It is 
designed to quantify the level of economic freedom that exists in a country, and is deliberately 
designed to quantify the quality of economic institutions but to leave out measures of political 
freedom, such as civil liberties or democratic government. Thus, it is a good measure of 
institutional quality to use for the examination of the hypothesis that autocrats can increase their 
wealth by imposing economically unproductive institutions. 
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Table 1. List of leaders. 
Country Leader years $ Wealth † 
Angola Jose Eduardo Dos Santos 1979-Present 31 billion 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev 2003-Present 500 million 
Bahrain Hamad ibn isa al Khalifa 2002-Present 5.44 billion 
Bangladesh Khaleda Zia  1991-1996; 2001-2006 220 million 
Cameroon Paul Biya 1982-Present 200 million 
China Wen Jiabao 2003-Present 2.7 billion 
Colombia Juan Manuel Santos 2010-Present 215 million 
Dem. Rep. of Congo  Mobutu Sese Seko  1970-1997 6.9 billion 
Egypt Hosni Mubarek 1981-2011 40 billion 
Ethiopia Girma Wolde-Giorgis 2001-Present 1.5 million 
Gabon Ali Bongo Ondimba 2009-Present 1 billion 
Indonesia mohamed suharto  1967-1998 21.8 billion 
Iran Ali Khamenei 1981-Present 30 billion 
Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev 1991-Present 1.11 billion 
Kuwait H.H Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad  Al-Jaber Al-Sabah 2006-Present 14.23 billion 
Montenegro Milo Đukanović  2003-2006; 2008-2010 15 million 
Morocco Mohammad IV 1999-Present 2.5 billion 
Myanmar Than Shwe 1992-2011 4 billion 
Netherlands Beatrix 1980-2013 200 million 
Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan 2010-Present 2.8 million 
Norway Harald V 1991-Present 17.3 million 
Oman Qaboos Bin Said Al Said 1970-Present 9.33 billion 
Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari 2008-Present 1.8 billion 
Philippines Benigno Noynoy Aquino III 2010-Present 1.3 million 
Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa 1995-Present 10.88 billion 
Saudi Arabia Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz 2005-Present 21 billion 
Spain Juan Carlos I 1975-2014 5 billion 
Sweden Carl XVI Gustaf 1973-Present 42 million 
Syria Bashar Al-Assad 2000-Present 1 billion 
Thailand Bhumibol Adulyadej 1946-Present 30 billion 
Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 1987-2011 7.8 billion 
U.A.E. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan 2004-Present 21 billion 
Uganda Yoweri Musevini 1986-Present 1.7 billion 
United Kingdom Elizabeth II 1952-Present 450 million 
Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe 1987-2017 10 billion 
Note - † wealth amounts ending before 2010 are converted into 2010 dollars. 
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Literature reviews by Berggren (2003) and De Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturn (2006) show that 
countries with higher-quality economic institutions as measured by the EFW index, have higher 
per capita incomes, and countries that improve their economic freedom as measured by the 
index have higher rates of economic growth. Subsequent studies, such as Faria and 
Montesinos (2009), have reaffirmed the positive impact of market institutions. Countries with 
higher quality institutions, as measured by the EFW index, are more prosperous. This makes 
the EFW index the ideal measure of the quality of economic institutions for present purposes, 
because of the many studies that have shown it is positively correlated with per capita income 
and income growth. While there is little doubt that higher-quality economic institutions improve 
the economic well-being of a country, the question examined here is whether autocrats who 
maintain low-quality institutions to the detriment of their citizens receive personal benefits in the 
form of higher personal wealth. It is a more direct measure of personal benefit than was used in 
any of the previous studies. 
 
4. Institutional Quality and the Wealth of Autocrats 
 
The hypothesis that autocrats maintain low-quality institutions to increase their wealth is tested 
directly in an OLS model by looking at the correlation between autocrat wealth and institutional 
quality. The dependent variable is the log of the wealth of each political leader, W, and the 
major independent variables are measures of the quality of economic and political institutions at 
the beginning of the leaders’ tenure and the average annual change in institutional quality 
during their tenures. Economic institutions are measured by the EFW score at the beginning of 
the leaders’ tenures, InitialEFW, and the average annual change in the EFW measure, 
EFWRate, over the leaders’ tenures. EFWRate is calculated by subtracting InitialEFW from the 
final EFW value and dividing by the number of years the leader held power. Four different 
measures are used for the quality of political institutions, which are measured the same way. 
Initial political rights are represented as InitialPL, and the change over the autocrats’ tenures is 
PLRate. The measures used are the Polity 2 index, the Freedom House index of political 
freedom, and the two individual components of the Freedom House index: Political Rights, and 
Civil Rights. 
InitialEFW and InitialPR are variables outside the control of the autocrat, but they could 
influence the autocrat’s wealth. EFWRate and PLRate are variables that, according to the 
hypothesis being examined, are under the autocrat’s control. The hypothesis predicts that 
autocrats choose poor institutions for their own benefit, but they could not choose those 
institutions if institutional quality is outside their control. The hypothesis being examined 
assumes a direction of causation that runs from EFWRate and PLRate to autocrat wealth. 
Other factors could also affect autocrat wealth. Most obviously, people in wealthier countries 
tend to be wealthier, so per capita income when the autocrat comes to power, InitialPCI, and the 
change in per capita income over the autocrat’s tenure, PCIRate, are included. Some scholars, 
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such as Diamond (1997) and Sachs (2001), have suggested that natural resource endowments 
can affect incomes and institutional quality, so a measure of resource rents, R, is included in the 
empirical model. Easterly (2006) and Coyne (2013) have suggested foreign aid is often 
counterproductive to the countries that receive it, although it might benefit a country’s political 
elite, prompting the inclusion of foreign aid, F, in the empirical model. Another geographic factor 
often associated with a state’s economic well-being is distance from the equator, D. Following 
Holcombe and Boudreaux (2013), the length of tenure, T, of an autocrat might be related to the 
autocrat’s wealth, and a binary variable, M, is included which is 1 for autocrats who are 
monarchs and 0 otherwise.3 Appendix 2 shows variable definitions and sources. The empirical 
specification is 
 
W = α + β1InitialEFW + β2EFWRate + β3InitialPCI + β4PCIRate + β5R + β6F + β7D + β8T +  
+ β9M + β10InitialPI + β11PIRate + ε. 
 
The empirical results for eight different empirical specifications are reported in Table 2. 
The specifications differ only in that four of them include only EFWRate, not, InitialEFW, and 
different measures are used to measure the differences in political institutions. In the eight 
different specifications, InitialEFW is never statistically significant at the 10 percent level or 
better, while EFWRate is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in three of 
the four specifications which omit InitialEFW. The results in Table 2 indicate that the quality of 
economic institutions at the time an autocrat takes office are unrelated to autocrat wealth, but 
there is weak evidence that wealth is higher when the quality of economic institutions improves 
over the autocrat’s tenure. Consistent with previous studies, those results show that if anything, 
autocrats benefit from improvements in the quality of economic institutions during their tenures. 
Initial per capita income is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in half of the 
regressions, and the autocrat’s length of tenure is statistically significant in all of them. Autocrats 
who rule over higher-income countries tend to have higher levels of wealth, and autocrats who 
retain power longer tend to have higher wealth. The direction of causation of the tenure variable 
is uncertain. Wealthier autocrats might have an advantage in maintaining power, but it also may 
be that longer tenures allow more time to accumulate wealth. The wealth variable measures 
wealth at the end of the autocrat’s tenure, and data limitations do not allow calculating the 
change in the autocrat’s wealth over the autocrat’s tenure. Perhaps the Tenure variable is 
significant because autocrats with longer tenures tend to come to power at a younger age. To 
check for this, the age that autocrats assumed power was substituted for Tenure, and the age 
variable was significant. However, when both age and Tenure were included in the same 
regressions, Tenure remained significant but age did not. Thus, we report the specifications 
than include only the Tenure variable. 
  
                                                            
3 All specifications were also run without the monarchy variable and the institutional variables were 
qualitatively the same, so for space considerations the paper does not report the results without the 
monarchy variable. 
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Table 2. Effect of Economic and Political Institutions on the Wealth of Leaders. 
 Log wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial EFW  -0.357  -0.275  -0.510  -0.536 
  (-1.08)  (-0.69)  (-1.33)  (-1.27) 
EFW rate 4.866 1.753 8.139+ 5.578 9.924+ 5.138 9.713+ 4.501 
 (1.19) (0.42) (1.74) (0.98) (1.80) (0.88) (1.86) (0.74) 
Initial PCI† 0.0220 0.0410 0.0688* 0.0817* 0.0668 0.0912* 0.0548 0.0813+ 
 (0.86) (1.32) (2.17) (2.13) (1.70) (2.09) (1.38) (1.79) 
PCI rate† -0.0864 -0.0647 -0.128 -0.0992 -0.206 -0.168 0.0907 0.0834 
 (-0.27) (-0.19) (-0.51) (-0.36) (-0.60) (-0.46) (0.22) (0.19) 
Resource rents 0.0317 0.0314 0.00305 0.00442 0.0104 0.0120 0.0184 0.0215 
 (1.30) (1.31) (0.15) (0.20) (0.41) (0.46) (0.64) (0.72) 
Foreign aid -8.823 -11.30 -9.652 -11.33 -8.410 -12.12 -9.650 -13.18 
 (-1.23) (-1.47) (-0.81) (-0.88) (-0.77) (-1.02) (-0.77) (-0.98) 
Distance† 0.101 0.111 0.0573 0.0722 0.0280 0.0496 -0.0300 -0.0121 
 (0.47) (0.50) (0.29) (0.35) (0.13) (0.22) (-0.14) (-0.05) 
Tenure 0.0433+ 0.0425+ 0.0685** 0.0670** 0.0591* 0.0565* 0.0941** 0.0879** 
 (2.00) (1.98) (2.89) (2.99) (2.39) (2.49) (3.10) (3.18) 
Initial Polity2 -0.181* -0.177*       
 (-2.49) (-2.37)       
Polity2 rate 7.728** 7.206*       
 (2.80) (2.57)       
Monarchy 1.064 1.026 0.521 0.545 0.650 0.655 0.702 0.754 
 (1.38) (1.33) (0.50) (0.52) (0.68) (0.69) (0.59) (0.66) 
Initial Freedom house   -1.140*** -1.109***     
   (-5.62) (5.01)     
Freedom rate   -11.90
+ -10.49     
   (2.03) (1.57)     
Initial Political rights     -0.926*** -0.879**   
     (3.78) (3.38)   
Political rights rate     1.906 1.511   
     (-0.19) (-0.15)   
Initial civil rights       -1.024** -0.942* 
       (3.07) (2.61) 
Civil rights rate       -7.338 -7.686 
       (-1.11) (-1.24) 
Constant -2.836* -0.691 -7.579*** -5.864* -6.809** -3.572 -7.552** -3.972 
 (-2.38) (-0.35) (-5.02) (-2.26) (-3.26) (-1.25) (-3.47) (-1.16) 
Adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.37 
Note. N=35 observations. t statistics in parentheses. + p<0.10* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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One possible area of concern in the list of autocrats used here is that they represent 
governments with vastly different government structures. The list includes the Queen Elizabeth 
II of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and former President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, for 
example. The inclusion of these measures of political institutions should mitigate those 
differences by taking into account the political structure. As a robustness check, the regressions 
were run without Elizabeth II, and without Assad of Syria, and the results are essentially 
unaffected.4 Monarchs were also separated out with a binary variable, and Table 2 shows that 
the monarchy variable was never statistically significant. 
The quality of political institutions is controlled for in the same way as economic institutions. 
The first two regressions use the Polity2 index to control for political institutions. The index rates 
the degree of democratic control of government, with values ranging from -10 for the least 
democratic institutions to 10 for the most democratic. In the first two regressions, the negative 
sign on Initial Polity2 shows that the less democratic are the initial political institutions, the 
higher is the wealth of the autocrat. The positive sign on Polity2 Rate shows that movements 
toward more democratic institutions during the autocrat’s tenure are associated with higher 
autocrat wealth. While the quality of economic institutions appears to have weak effects on 
autocrat wealth, as political institutions do. The less democratic a state’s institutions when the 
autocrat assumes power, the more wealthy the autocrat, and the more the country moves 
toward democratic institutions during the autocrat’s tenure, the higher the wealth of the autocrat. 
This suggests a benefit to the autocrat from moving toward more democratic institutions. 
The remaining six regressions use the Freedom House index of political freedom as a 
robustness check on this result. The Freedom House index measures both civil rights and 
political rights—the degree to which citizens have control over their governments—as 
components of political freedom. Regressions 3 and 4 replace the Polity2 index with the 
Freedom House index of political freedom, and while the initial level of political freedom is 
negative and significant, consistent with the Polity2 results, Freedom Rate, which is the average 
annual change in political freedom over the autocrat’s tenure is not statistically significant. The 
Freedom House index looks at political institutions more broadly than Polity2, and the political 
rights component is more consistent with the democratic control measured by Polity2 than is the 
entire index. Regressions 5 and 6 include only the political rights component of the Freedom 
House index. The results are similar to those using the entire index. Initial political rights show 
up negative and significant, as with the entire index, the Political Rights rate is not statistically 
significant. Regressions 7 and 8 include only the civil rights component of the Freedom House 
index, and yield the same qualitative result. 
  
                                                            
4 Assad was deleted as a robustness check because there is some question about the actual amount of 
his wealth. 
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Table 3. Effect of Economic and Political Institutions on the Wealth of Leaders (Ordered Probit model). 
 Wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial EFW -0.0967 0.404 -0.217 0.319 -0.203 0.390 -0.227 0.277 
 (-0.54) (1.56) (-1.14) (1.21) (-1.14) (1.29) (-1.21) (1.03) 
EFW rate  20.64**  22.08***  26.95***  22.08*** 
  (2.93)  (3.68)  (3.32)  (3.58) 
Initial PCI† 0.0380+ 0.0135 0.0870** 0.0681* 0.0716** 0.0712* 0.0774** 0.0543* 
 (1.95) (0.50) (2.95) (2.33) (2.60) (2.48) (2.92) (1.97) 
PCI rate† -0.302 -0.125 -0.313 -0.174 -0.449 -0.061 -0.431 -0.164 
 (-0.91) (-0.38) (-0.93) (-0.54) (-1.12) (-1.02) (-1.14) (-0.48) 
Resource rents 0.0102 0.0291 0.00521 0.0208 0.00248 0.0202 0.0112 0.0252 
 (0.62) (1.57) (0.34) (1.28) (0.16) (1.25) (0.67) (1.53) 
Foreign aid -8.657+ -7.829 -8.866+ -8.276 -9.496+ -9.218 -9.047+ -9.018 
 (-1.78) (-1.26) (-1.66) (-1.19) (-1.73) (-1.23) (-1.73) (-1.25) 
Distance† -0.00798 -0.149 -0.0330 -0.150 -0.0255 -0.185 -0.0744 -0.180 
 (-0.07) (-1.07) (-0.25) (-1.08) (-0.21) (-1.28) (-0.58) (-1.45) 
tenure 0.0150 0.0221 0.0380** 0.0458** 0.0212+ 0.0313* 0.0309* 0.0452** 
 (1.19) (1.60) (2.66) (2.63) (1.65) (2.00) (2.16) (2.95) 
Initial polity2 -0.0900+ -0.0982*       
 (-1.94) (-2.12)       
Polity2 rate 2.528 3.189*       
 (1.58) (2.03)       
Monarchy 1.006* 1.482* 1.164** 1.410** 0.895* 1.390** 1.156** 1.323** 
 (2.26) (2.51) (2.61) (2.92) (2.21) (3.05) (2.71) (2.83) 
Initial Freedom house  -0.567*** -0.672***     
   (-3.45) (4.30)     
Freedom rate   5.073 2.386     
   (-1.47) (-0.71)     
Initial Political rights    -0.392** -0.572***   
     (2.81) (4.06)   
Political rights rate    1.323 3.715   
     (-0.32) (-0.70)   
Initial Civil rights       -0.409* -0.547** 
       (2.32) (3.06) 
Civil rights rate       -8.781* -6.811 
       (-2.40) (-1.24) 
LR Χ2 27.94 40.18 32.10 44.36 25.92 43.57 25.22 34.25 
Note. N=35 observations. t statistics in parentheses. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. † in 
thousands. Dependent variable is ordered in four categories.  
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In all regressions, whether the Polity2 index or variants of the Freedom House index are 
used to quantify the quality of political institutions, lower-quality political institutions are 
associated with higher levels of autocrat wealth. Autocrat wealth tends to be higher when 
autocrats come to power in countries that are less democratic, where citizens have fewer 
political rights and lower levels of civil rights. Assuming that political freedom and more 
democratic control of government are good things, the lower the quality of political institutions 
when an autocrat assumes power, the higher will be the autocrat’s wealth. Regardless of how 
the quality of those political institutions is measured, the coefficients are always significant at the 
1 percent level. 
As a robustness check on these results, Autocrat Wealth was respecified into four 
categories: 1: those with wealth under $100 million; 2: wealth between $100 million and $1 
billion; 3: wealth between $1 billion and $10 billion; and 4: wealth greater than $10 billion. 
Ordered probits were run using the same eight specifications as in Table 2, and those results 
appear in Table 3. The results are mostly unchanged, but with two differences worth noting. The 
Polity2 Rate is not significant in the ordered probit, but more noteworthy, EFWRate is strongly 
significant and positive in all four specifications in which it is included. 
Autocrats are wealthier in countries that have improving economic institutions under their 
rule. Consistent with Holcombe and Rodet (2012) and Holcombe and Boudreaux (2013), this 
suggests that an increase in the quality of economic institutions makes autocrats better off, 
which calls into question the conventional wisdom that autocrats benefit from maintaining low-
quality institutions. Consistent with the results in Table 2, the measures of initial political 
institutions all remain negative and highly statistically significant. Also note that, in contrast to 
Table 2, the monarchy variable is positive and statistically significant in all of the regressions in 
Table 3. While this indicates that monarchs tend to be wealthier than other autocrats, the 
institutional variables are qualitatively the same in both tables. 
Table 4 shows a correlation matrix with all of the economic and political institutions variables. 
The Table shows a positive, although weak, correlation between the Initial EFW and all of the 
initial political variables.5 Because the measured quality of economic institutions and the 
measured quality of political institutions are positively correlated, what appears to be the effect 
of economic institutions may actually be the result of political institutions. People have observed 
wealthy autocrats overseeing countries with low-quality economic institutions and inferred that 
those autocrats benefit from maintaining low-quality institutions, but this evidence points to a 
different conclusion: countries with lower-quality political institutions tend to attract wealthier 
autocrats. The positive correlation between the quality of political and economic institutions 
means that those wealthy autocrats will also be ruling countries with low-quality economic 
institutions. Autocrat wealth is negatively correlated with the quality of political institutions when 
they assume power. 
                                                            
5 Also note that there tends to be a negative correlation between the initial variables and the rate variables. 
This may indicate convergence in institutional quality, although the correlation coefficients are small 
enough in magnitude that one would hesitate to draw firm conclusions from them. 
117 
C. Boudreaux and R. Holcombe / European Journal of Government and Economics 6(2), 106-125 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix. 
 
Initial 
efw 
Efw 
rate 
Initial 
Polity 
2 
Polity2 
rate 
Initial 
freedom 
house 
Freedom 
rate 
Initial 
civil 
rights 
Civil 
rights 
rate 
Initial 
political 
rights 
Political 
rights 
rate 
Initial efw 1 
         
Efw rate -0.530 1 
        
Initial Polity 2 0.179 -0.140 1 
       
Polity2 rate -0.435 0.257 -0.277 1 
      
Initial freedom house 0.294 -0.154 0.784 -0.216 1 
     
Freedom rate 0.125 0.156 0.246 0.021 -0.072 1 
    
Initial civil rights 0.314 -0.167 0.752 -0.165 0.932 0.031 1 
   
Civil rights rate -0.181 0.285 0.214 0.236 0.048 0.020 -0.066 1 
  
Initial political rights 0.272 -0.044 0.828 -0.234 0.932 0.138 0.924 -0.059 1 
 
Political rights rate -0.043 0.023 -0.041 0.339 -0.122 0.121 -0.091 0.54 -0.253 1 
 
 
If there is any correlation between their wealth and a change in the quality of economic 
institutions, it is that improving economic institutions during an autocrat’s rule is associated with 
higher autocrat wealth. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that autocrats 
maintain low-quality institutions because they benefit from them. The empirical results have 
implications with regard to both economic institutions and political institutions, which are 
discussed in the next two sections. 
 
5. Autocrat Wealth and Economic Institutions 
 
The paper’s introduction notes the conventional wisdom that autocrats in countries with low-
quality economic institutions do not improve those institutions because the political elite benefit 
from the low-quality institutions even though those institutions lower the economic well-being of 
the general population. Empirical evidence for that hypothesis is anecdotal, and an important 
question is: If the political elite benefit from maintaining low-quality economic institutions, what 
benefit does it receive? The only articles that look at a cross-section of countries to evaluate 
that hypothesis do not support it. Holcombe and Rodet (2012) find that the political elite can 
increase the resources under its control by improving the quality of economic institutions, and 
Holcombe and Boudreaux (2013) find that improving the quality of economic institutions 
lengthens the tenure of autocrats and stabilizes their political power. This paper finds that if 
anything, improving the quality of economic institutions is associated with higher autocrat 
wealth, and there is no evidence in any of these studies of any benefit to the political elite from 
maintaining low-quality economic institutions. 
The evidence in this paper is based on a limited dataset, and certainly is not conclusive, but 
it does contribute some additional evidence to the literature that finds no benefit to autocrats 
from maintaining low-quality institutions, and finds that if anything, autocrats can improve their 
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well-being in several dimensions by overseeing institutional improvements. Applied narrowly to 
the conventional wisdom, the question raised by this literature is, what is the benefit the political 
elite receive from maintaining low-quality institutions? Perhaps different data or empirical 
methods will reveal some benefit, but at this point, the literature has identified no benefit to the 
political elite from maintaining low-quality economic institutions. There is room for additional 
research on this question, either to identify the benefit the political elite gains from maintaining 
low-quality economic institutions, or to provide additional evidence supporting the studies that, 
at this point, all indicate that the political elite do not benefit from keeping their countries poor. 
This empirical result raises the question of why, if autocrats would benefit personally from 
improving institutional quality, they do not make those improvements. One would think that 
autocrats would know their own interests at least as well as academics. One reason might be 
that institutional change is difficult to implement, so even if autocrats see the benefit from doing 
so, they may not be able to actually accomplish institutional reforms. Some autocrats—Augusto 
Pinochet and Park Chung-hee were mentioned earlier—have done so, while others have not. 
The idea that autocrats see advantages to institutional reform but are unable to accomplish it is 
a conjecture that goes beyond the analysis in this paper, so is a topic for future research. With 
regard to economic institutions, the major question this paper prompts is what benefit, if any, 
autocrats receive from maintaining low-quality institutions. Thus far, the literature has provided 
no systematic evidence that there are any benefits. 
 
6. Autocrat Wealth and Political Institutions 
 
The empirical results in this paper consistently find a strong negative correlation between the 
quality of political institutions at the time an autocrat assumes power and the wealth of 
autocrats. Wealthier autocrats tend to come to power in those countries in which the political 
institutions are poorest. A possible explanation for this finding is that in countries with low-quality 
political institutions, wealthy individuals seek political power to protect their wealth. Winters 
(2011: 7) notes, “In systems where property is reliably defended externally (especially by an 
armed state through institutions and strong property rights and norms), oligarchs have no 
compelling need to be armed or engaged directly in political roles.” Bill Gates and Warren 
Buffett do not need to seek direct political power (although they do lobby to attempt to turn 
political outcomes their way) because political institutions in the United States protect their 
wealth, but in countries with lower-quality political institutions, Winters argues that the economic 
elite has more of an incentive to secure political power directly to prevent the political elite from 
appropriating its wealth.6 
This suggests that the conventional wisdom may be based on a mistaken interpretation of 
the observation that political leaders in countries with low-quality institutions tend to be wealthy. 
                                                            
6 Winters (2011: 6) defines oligarchs as “…actors who command and control massive concentrations of 
material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social 
position.” An example that illustrates the benefit of the wealthy assuming political power to protect their 
wealth is Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Russia, whose oil wealth at one time made him Russia’s wealthiest 
individual, but was jailed for 10 years by Putin and had his assets appropriated by the state. 
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The observation of wealthy autocrats ruling over poorer countries suggests the conventional 
wisdom that those autocrats benefit from the low-quality institutions, but another possibility is 
that the wealthy seek political power to protect their wealth from predation by the political elite in 
countries that have a poor record of protecting property rights and maintaining rule of law. The 
elite does not benefit from maintaining low-quality institutions, but rather seeks political power to 
protect itself from being the victim of political predation under those institutions. Where political 
institutions are weak, wealth is more at risk to be confiscated by the political elite, so the wealthy 
have an incentive to convert some of its wealth into political power, to protect the rest. 
We do not doubt that once it gains political power, the political elite will use that power to 
further its own interests, but examples of corrupt autocrats using political power to their 
advantage do not speak directly to the conventional wisdom. The question is whether the 
political elite would benefit more from maintaining low-quality institutions or from initiating 
institutional improvements, and all of the evidence so far—including the evidence in this paper—
indicates that the political elite would be better off by overseeing improvements in institutional 
quality. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
A substantial literature demonstrates that states with economic institutions that protect property 
rights and support market exchange prosper, while those with poor institutions that inhibit 
market activity remain poor. Mokyr (1990) and Landes (1998) give persuasive historical 
evidence, and Olson (1996) notes that profit opportunities do not remain unexploited for long. 
Poor countries remain that way because their economic institutions prevent innovative and 
entrepreneurial acts from being profitable. Entrepreneurial individuals are led to predatory rather 
than productive activity in countries with low-quality economic institutions, Baumol (1990) notes. 
Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2012) identify and quantify those institutions that lead to 
prosperity. If economists know what economic institutions lay a foundation for growth and 
prosperity, an important question for world economic development is why poor countries do not 
adopt those institutions. A commonly-given answer is that even though most of the population 
would benefit from institutional reform, the political elite benefits from maintaining those low-
quality institutions, even as they impose costs on most people in their countries. 
This paper has two main conclusions. First, it offers support for a small empirical literature 
which finds that autocrats do not benefit from maintaining low-quality institutions. Autocrats who 
maintain low-quality institutions do not increase their wealth as a result, and this finding is 
consistent with an existing literature finding that if anything, autocrats will be better off if they 
oversee improvements in institutional quality. The empirical evidence indicates that the 
hypothesis that autocrats in poor countries maintain low-quality political institutions because 
they benefit is incorrect. 
Second, the paper finds that there is a negative correlation between the quality of political 
institutions and the wealth of autocrats at the time when they assume power. Rather than asking 
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why autocrats maintain low-quality institutions, this result suggests a different question, which is 
why countries with lower-quality political institutions attract wealthier autocrats. A possible 
explanation for this is that high-quality political institutions protect individual wealth, so wealthy 
individuals in countries with high-quality institutions do not need to assume positions of political 
power to retain their economic power. Wealthy autocrats tend to assume power in countries with 
low-quality political institutions. They can use their wealth to try to buy political power, and then 
use their political power to try to protect and enhance their wealth. An important question is 
whether maintaining low-quality economic institutions furthers those goals, and this paper 
supports a recent literature that says it does not. The results in this paper go a good distance 
toward understanding why even though wealthy autocrats rule countries with poor institutions, 
they do not benefit from maintaining low-quality institutions. 
When wealthy autocrats gain political power, they will use it to enhance and protect their 
wealth. We do not disagree with the conventional wisdom on this point. The question is whether 
it is to their advantage to maintain low-quality economic institutions, and this paper provides 
additional evidence to support the existing literature which says they do not. Political elites tend 
to be wealthier in countries with low-quality institutions not because they benefit from keeping 
institutional quality low, but because where institutional quality is low the wealthy have a greater 
incentive to seek political power. 
Any empirical evidence on a hypothesis is always tentative. The questions addressed here 
are important for economic development and to date, the small amount of empirical research 
has not found evidence that low-quality institutions benefit the political elite. More research 
would be welcome, either to reinforce the tentative conclusion that the political elite does not 
benefit from maintaining low-quality economic institutions, or to provide evidence that when 
other data are examined or other methods are used, there is indeed evidence to support the 
hypothesis that autocrats receive personal benefits from maintaining these institutions. It 
appears that autocrats in countries with low-quality institutions tend to be wealthier because the 
wealthy have a greater incentive to seek political power in those countries, to protect their 
wealth, but this tentative conclusion would benefit from further research. 
Important implications for development policy turn on the question. One would be hard-
pressed to argue that autocrats do not understand what is in their own interest. If the conclusion 
that autocrats do not benefit from maintaining low-quality economic institutions holds up to 
further scrutiny, this would suggest that outside agencies and foreign governments can look for 
ways to help autocrats implement institutional reform. If the conventional wisdom is correct, then 
there is more of an argument for pushing for regime change and perhaps broader political 
reforms. Further research on this issue would be very worthwhile, regardless of whether it 
supports our finding or, after further study, finds contrary evidence. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Sources of leaders’ wealth 
 
Leader Wealth Source 
Jose Eduardo Dos Santos http://docteurmilando.ivoire-blog.com/archive/2011/01/14/angola-jose-eduardo-dos-santos-possede-une-fortune-de-31-mil.html 
Ilham Aliyev http://www.celebritynetworth.com/richest-politicians/presidents/ilham-aliyev-net-worth/ 
Hamad ibn isa al Khalifa http://www.almanachdegotha.org/id229.html 
Khaleda Zia http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=71084%3Cbr%20/%3E 
Paul Biya http://www.therichest.org/nation/richest-person-in-cameroon/ 
wen jiabao http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2012/oct/26/who-are-the-wealthiest-world-leaders 
Juan Manuel Santos http://en.mediamass.net/people/juan-manuel-santos/highest-paid.html 
Mobutu Sese Seko http://www.ghanafilla.net/archives/33753#.UbXY6fnqkfV 
Hosni Mubarek http://in.finance.yahoo.com/photos/8-of-the-richest-dictators-in-history-slideshow/hosni-mubarak-photo-1348740984.html 
Girma Wolde-Giorgis http://www.celebritynetworth.com/richest-politicians/presidents/girma-woldegiorgis-net-worth/ 
Ali Bongo Ondimba http://in.finance.yahoo.com/photos/8-of-the-richest-dictators-in-history-slideshow/ali-bongo-ondimba-photo-1348740985.html 
mohamed suharto  http://www.cbv.ns.ca/dictator/Suharto.html 
Ali Khamenei  http://money.ca.msn.com/savings-debt/gallery/dictators-and-their-wealth?page=5 
Uhuru Kenyatta http://www.nairobiwire.com/2013/04/uhuru-kenyatta-is-africas-richest.html 
H.H Sheikh Sabah IV Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber 
Al-Sabah http://www.almanachdegotha.org/id229.html 
Filip Vujanović 
https://reportingproject.net/underground/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6:ukanovis-montenegro-a-family-
business&catid=3:stories&Itemid=19 
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Leader Wealth Source 
Mohammad IV http://www.therichest.com/celebnetworth/politician/royal/king-mohammed-iv-net-worth/ 
Beatrix http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2011/04/29/the-worlds-richest-royals/ 
Goodluck Jonathan http://nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/ogaga-ifowodo/vice-president-jonathans-qmodestq-fortune.html 
Harald V http://e24.no/makro-og-politikk/kongens-formue-under-100-mill/3603222 
Qaboos Bin Said Al Said  http://www.almanachdegotha.org/id229.html 
Asif Ali Zardari http://www.daily.pk/president-asif-ali-zardari-2nd-most-richest-man-of-pakistan-6666/ 
Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III http://www.affordablecebu.com/load/finance_wealth/president_benigno_quot_noynoy_quot_aquino_iii_net_worth/34-1-0-2692 
Hamad bin Khalifa http://www.almanachdegotha.org/id229.html 
Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz  http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/03/cz_forbes_0522_royals_slide.html?thisSpeed=35000 
Carl XVI Gustaf http://exploredia.com/richest-politicians-in-the-world/ 
Bashar Al-Assad http://in.finance.yahoo.com/photos/8-of-the-richest-dictators-in-history-slideshow/bashar-al-assad-photo-1348740985.html 
Bhumibol Adulyadej http://www.almanachdegotha.org/id229.html 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali http://money.ca.msn.com/savings-debt/gallery/dictators-and-their-wealth?page=3 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/03/cz_forbes_0522_royals_slide_3.html?thisSpeed=35000 
Yoweri Musevini http://ddungu.wordpress.com/2012/04/13/president-yoweri-mueveni-s-accumulation-of-wealth-surprises-ugandans%E2%80%8F/ 
Elizabeth II http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2011/04/29/the-worlds-richest-royals/ 
Robert Mugabe http://in.finance.yahoo.com/photos/8-of-the-richest-dictators-in-history-slideshow/robert-mugabe-photo-1348740999.html 
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2. Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Log Wealth Natural log of real wealth See Appendix Table 1 
EFW rate (EFW at end - EFW at beginning )/ 
tenure 
Economic Freedom of the World 2012 
Initial EFW EFW at beginning of tenure Economic Freedom of the World 2012 
PCI rate (PCI at end - PCI at beginning) / tenure GDP per capita, World Bank, PPP 
Initial PCI PCI at beginning of tenure GDP per capita, World Bank, PPP 
Freedom Rate (Freedom at end - Freedom at 
beginning)/ tenure 
Freedom House, freedom rating 
Initial Freedom Freedom at beginning of tenure Freedom House, freedom rating 
Civil Rights 
Rate 
(Civil Rights at end - Civil Rights at 
beginning)/ tenure 
Freedom House, civil liberties 
Initial Civil 
Rights 
Civil Rights at beginning of tenure Freedom House, civil liberties 
Political Rights 
Rate 
(Political Rights at end - Political Rights 
at beginning)/ tenure 
Freedom House, political rights 
Initial Political 
Rights 
Political Rights at beginning of tenure Freedom House, political rights 
Polity2 Rate (Polity2 at end - Polity2 at beginning)/ 
tenure 
Polity IV 
Initial Polity2 Polity2 at beginning of tenure Polity IV 
Distance Distance from the Equator http://lab.lmnixon.org/4th/worldcapitals.html;  
  http://www.eaae-astronomy.org/eratosthenes/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article 
&id=47&item&id-68 
Resource 
Rents 
Natural resources (% of GDP) Total natural resources, World Bank 
ODA Official Development Assistance (% of 
GDP) 
IndexMundi.com, Net Official Development Assistance and 
Official Aid Received 
Tenure Length of Tenure (in years)  
 
